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As legislative case studies accumulate, it becomes harder and harder to re-
member who did what to whom with what effects, or who got what and
when - never mind why. Thus, would-be beneficiaries of this burgeoning
literature are entitled to ask of new legislative cases as they appear, "Why
bother? What makes this particular case study worth reading?"
Perhaps it is especially well written, and can give laymen or the idly curious
an intuitive "feel" for political processes or institutions. At least two recent
studies of federal aid to education have had this distinction.1 Or perhaps the
author is concerned with theorizing, generalizing, and speculating. The little
world of the case is exploited as a guide to the big world outside. One such
study, ostensibly on reciprocal trade legislation, is actually a gold mine of
general propositions on Congress and the legislative process." Or, perhaps, the
subject matter itself is of such great importance that the reader can be sure of
finding something worthwhile in the study regardless of the explicit intentions
of the author and almost regardless of his skill.
It is at this third point that a discussion of Power and Politics in Labor
Legislation most appropriately begins. The Landrum-Griffin Act, which is the
subject of this study, was a major event in recent congressional history. Many
alliances and enmities within Congress date from the three-cornered struggle
over the passage of this law. The student of Congress who tramps up and
down the Capitol's endless maze of marble corridors today and tomorrow will
have to know about Landrum-Griffin to catch the full flavor of congressional
resentment at overenthusiastic attempts to persuade them from the outside.
Landrum-Griffin did more than any other bill in the 86th Congress to solidify
support for the Democratic Study Group, an informal organization of House
liberals that over the last few years has grown in size and influence. Finally,
Landrum-Griffin illuminated the beginnings of the presidential campaign of
1960. Newspaper readers will recall how Senator Kennedy unexpectedly lost
control of his bill on the Senate floor, how his presidential rival, Senator
Humphrey, flew back from the west coast to help bail him out, how Vice-
President Nixon was forced to cast a tie-breaking vote against the wishes of
organized labor. Certainly, in his choice of a case to write about, the author
of this book did admirably.
On other counts, however, this study is less satisfactory. For one thing,
Professor McAdams writes confusing prose. He uses the passive voice to
excess; sometimes this makes it difficult to determine just which actors he
is talking about. He uses unclear metaphors, including a pendulum that seems
to swing only in one direction,3 and, at one point, a "sweetener" that is sup-
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posed to "purify the public perception" of a "collective moral aroma" - truly
Herculean work.
The book sets forth a thesis which the case is supposed to illustrate, but
the thesis is apparently not strong enough to order the various elements of
the study. This can be observed first in the rough chronological arrangement
of the narrative, but even more noticeably in the way in which irrelevant de-
tails billow and drift through chinks in the structure of the argument. Some
of these details are inaccurate; others reveal that the author, a professor
at Cornell University's Graduate School of Business and Public Administra-
tion, is well-versed in the internal politics of American labor organizations and
in the specifics of the bill at its various stages. However, they are on the whole
not germane to the book's main argument
This main argument grows out of an interesting anomaly. How could the
overwhelmingly liberal, Democratic 86th Congress enact a bill so distasteful
to labor? The answer, says Professor McAdams, is that the general public -
not interest groups, not internal congressional forces, but the "general public,"
consisting of "average citizens" - wanted a bill of this character. This made
such a bill a "political necessity."5
In the present state of political science, this is an extremely unorthodox
argument. The last quarter-century has not been kind to theories based on the
presumed political alertness and maneuverability of "average citizens" of the
"general public," as findings have accumulated that show how little they care
about most political issues and how much of their political behavior is based
upon stable and impervious habits. In the study of Congress two sorts of
explanation have recently found favor: explanations emphasizing the power
of interest groups; and those focusing upon the internal organization of Con-
gress and the independent preferences of congressmen and senators. Interest
group explanations seek to show how groups in society come to have prefer-
ences about public policy and how they go about obtaining the enactment of
these policies by persuasion or pressure. Internal explanations regard legis-
lators as somewhat more autonomous and self-directed, though bound in im-
portant ways by the rules and institutional practices of Congress.
In the present case, a purely interest group explanation would clearly be
deficient. The author stresses the inability of labor organizations to get what
they wanted and also, he charges, to formulate realistic goals. But it is not
clear that the author exhausted the possibilities of the internal theory. He
makes less, for example, of the presidential ambitions of senators intimately
involved in the development of the bill than another observer might have. And
his discussion of the Education and Labor Committee of the House could
have been greatly enriched by reference to findings of Richard Fenno about
the stresses and strains in its internal organization.0
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How would one go about substantiating an argument that the undifferentiated
mass of citizens known as the general public was more influential than eitfler
of these other factors in the enactment of a bill? I think the best way would
be to show an overwhelming sentiment for the legislation as expressed, let us
say, in a public opinion poll. This would be necessary to show public interest
though not sufficient to show public influence. In order to show influence, a
thoroughgoing description of public representations to congressmen and a de-
scription of direct congressional responses would be in order. Frequent state-
ments from congressmen that they were swayed by public sentiment or had
changed their minds or had been activated by public opinion (not, as some
were, by specific groups) would do nicely.
Yet, as a matter of fact, not a single poll or description of interaction be-
tween congressmen and public or statement of the kind I have indicated is
adduced in evidence in this book. The facts are established by a method of
demonstration which might be described as the method of reiteration. That is,
from time to time in the course of his narrative the author says that congress-
men or senators were doing what they were doing because of popular demand.
Under the circumstances, one cannot recommend this book to the "average
citizen." It would be most frustrating and unfair to him to read how powerful
he was in this instance, and yet to be unable to learn how he did it.
NELSON W. POLSBYt
tAssociate Professor of Government, Wesleyan University.
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